Political Essays
	Denko Maleski Macedonia

The Conduct of the Great Power

Abstract:

The cruel statistics of Balkan history show that not a single problem in the region has been resolved with a compromise, but that all “agreements” are a result either of wars or external interventions. The last series of Balkan wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia, including the one in Macedonia in 2001, only confirmed this observation. In that sense, the unilateral move of the US to accept the constitutional name of Macedonia is only a historical continuation of the external interventions in Balkan matters. The great power explained its move as a desire to introduce stability in the Balkans. True. However, it was precisely the policy of the two main power centers, the US and the EU, which, as hostages to Greek policy, continuously held the name issue open for more than thirteen years, causing a serious erosion of Macedonian national dignity, with two very dangerous consequences. The first consequence was breathing life into the traditional aspirations of neighboring countries towards the territory and the people in Macedonia. The second one was introducing internal instability into the state through extensive strengthening of the “Albanian factor” in the region, in contrast to the disputed Macedonian identity.

When, in 1991, Macedonia appeared on the international scene as an independent state, I became assured in practice that there is another truth about the role of the great powers in world politics than the one inscribed in our historical memory – namely, that they are hardly eager to suppress us under their authority. [1] I learnt that we, the representatives of the smaller states, in the fierce search for the security and survival of our country, beg the great ones to take us under their cover. They, on the other hand, following the rule that the great power must be careful not to become involved in the problems of a small state and thus lose the freedom to make decisions in accordance with their own national interests, are often not prepared to offer that cover. The source of the egoism of the great powers is in the egoism of the weak countries: namely, the alliance with the stronger country makes the weaker one inflexible in searching for compromise solutions for its problems with other states. Besides, historical experience warns the great powers not to identify their national interests with those of the weaker ally, because they can go as far as to be drawn into war. These are the iron laws of international politics that make the gates that protect the great powers.

How can one pass through those gates? Often, the representatives of the small countries raise their arms towards the sky in despair, imploring that they open. To retain the personal integrity and the dignity of one’s own country in this complicated diplomatic game is difficult as hell. My colleague from Bosnia and Herzegovina, H. Silajdzic, writing in the beginning of the nineties, had a simple recipe – “You put your dignity under your feet and beg for your country.” In fact, in the glowing arena of world politics, very similar to a circus, everyone knows their part. Of course, it is not very pleasant if your part is the one of a person whose task is to collect discretely during the course of the show what the elephants have left behind. Since, however, there is no world government, and the power of the great forces is the only guarantee for the survival of the small ones, we knock on their doors, and we accept anything that guarantees our survival. In accordance with this logic, which is similar to the fight for survival of the individual in domestic society, what has been especially important for the new democracies from the Baltic to the Balkans in the past decade and a half was the support of the most powerful state in the world today – America.

The experience of Macedonia, as a newly formed country in 1991, shows that this benign monster does not have the reflex of the Balkan states, which, almost as if by instinct, would suffocate the baby in its cradle. In accordance with its culture of celebrating life, the position of the US in international relations is to allow what was born to live in order to give it the opportunity to show whether it is capable of life or not. However, in accordance with the iron laws of international politics, America is careful not to allow the problems of the weak country to become its own. Thus, for many years, the great power was kept at safe distance from the issue of Macedonia and its problems with Greece.

“Macedonia is like a tar baby” – the first US envoy in our country, Robert Frovik, honestly admitted to me in 1991, making a clear allusion to the possibility that everyone who touches us gets stuck in our problems. Grateful for the honesty, we had to keep on trying in order to prove to the great power that we are capable of life because, made of tar or not, that is what we were. Then later, at the margins of a conference in Finland in 1992, there were new disappointing words, this time from the Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger: “Shit, but I have to warn you that we made a decision in the near future to recognize Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not Macedonia.” Shit or not, we had to wait patiently for the presidential election to pass, because the administration, understandably, was taking care of the Greek votes. In the end, it was us, not them, who had a problem with a NATO and EU member state, and on the scale of the US interests, Greece weighed much more than the emerging country – Macedonia. Thus, in the same year, directly after the American elections, President Gligorov was admitted into the White House complex by the National Security Advisor General Brent Scocroft, and the Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger so that we could hear their decision. In the course of the discussions, it became obvious that the main obstacle to recognizing Macedonia was, and remained, Greece. Scocroft pointed out examples of states that have changed their names, like Burma and Ceylon, while at my remark that they have done it at their own will, he answered that the survival of the country should be a sufficient motive to do that. And when the General entered into a long explication about the impossibilities of the great force recognizing Macedonia, Eagleberger joined the speech, and, addressing our president, said: “What he wants to say to you is that we have lost the elections.” The message was clear: no recognition could be expected from the outgoing administration of George Bush the elder. Nevertheless, they had our gratitude for receiving us in the White House and they listened to us, giving Macedonia support to continue to fight for its place under the Sun. However, the great power was very careful not to link its destiny with our uncertain future. Thus, the US recognized Macedonia, last of all former Yugoslav republics, on 8 February 1994, and did not established relations with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia until 13 September 1995!

Twelve years after the meeting with Gligorov in the White House, America fully completed the process of recognizing the country and its name. Why precisely now, and not earlier or later? The optimists in Macedonia, those who have known all these years (!) that, of course, we will win “the battle for the constitutional name” do not have to make any analysis, because their optimism does not require explanation. It is oriental optimism, which, as Andric writes, has no ground in reality, but only in itself! Reality, however, in the last thirteen years, has been pretty unfavorable for us. Namely, a consensus was reached among the US, EU and UN that Macedonia and Greece should find a jointly acceptable name for our county. The Resolution of the UN Security Council and the agreement that both sides signed in New York obliged us to it. But no one could foresee two things that would change this reality, and in that way also the politics of the great power. The first thing was that as a society, Greece would demonstrate incapability for compromise, and the second was that the terrorist attack on 11 September would take place.

In the past years, it has become obvious that Greek society and its politics are prisoners of an extremist nationalistic interpretation of their history. And while the essence of the modern politics, free from the chains of the past, is compromise, the Greek spiritual climate requires that the politician “wins or dies.” “Our name (Macedonia) is our life,” Andreas Papandreou proclaimed in a speech in Thessalonica in 1993, and nobody makes a compromise with his life. The science follows the lack of compromise in politics: “Greece… rejects the legitimacy of undertaking the Macedonian name in order to define a Slavic nation,” the historian Kofos wrote, insisting that his country is the only one that has the right to the name and the interpretation of history.

It was clear that Macedonia would not make a compromise with the name of its state, but what has also become clear in the meantime is that Greece could not make a compromise even if it wanted to. Hence the paradox that the two political elites, the Greek and the Macedonian, silently built an identical strategy in the “negotiations” – to delay a solution, because compromise, in any variant, is unacceptable for their societies! For the politicians, in particular, it would have meant political suicide. In New York, the negotiators of the two countries consistently implemented the strategy, creating an illusion of negotiations. Evidence of this is the fact that it was only after the shock from the recognition of the name by America that it became clear that the Greek parties had never even revised their very first decision – that the word Macedonia not be contained in the name of the country. Why? The universal commonality in the conduct of politicians in all states, at all times, is to be popular among the people. Thus, when the Greek politicians spoke of the “stealing” and “usurpation” of their history and culture by a Slavic people, and tried to break the will of the Macedonians with pressure and embargo, they guessed the feelings of their citizens, raising their popularity. However, when Holbrooke, in the name of the great power, forced the two sides to sign the Interim Agreement in 1995, the document could not create something that did not exist – an atmosphere of mutual understanding. That may happen in some future time, when the politicians and intellectuals say to their nations that people with dignity and with their own vision of truth for Macedonia live on both sides of the border. Until then, the power of the great forces to make a decision will be necessary.

The cruel statistics of Balkan history show that not a single problem in the region has been resolved with a compromise, but that all “agreements” are the result either of wars or external interventions. The last series of Balkan wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia, including the one in Macedonia in 2001, only confirmed this rule. In that sense, the unilateral move of the US to accept the constitutional name of Macedonia is only a historical continuation of external interventions in Balkan matters. The great power explained its move as motivated by the desire to introduce stability in the Balkans. True. However, it was precisely the policy of the two main power centers, the US and the EU, which, as hostages to Greek policy, constantly held the name issue open for more than thirteen years, causing a serious erosion of Macedonian national dignity with two very dangerous consequences. The first consequence was to breath life into the traditional aspirations of neighboring countries towards the territory and the people in Macedonia. The second was to introduce internal instability in the state through extensive strengthening of the “Albanian factor” in the region, in contrast to the disputed Macedonian identity. In this sense, the American decision to recognize the constitutional name created a new balance of forces in the Balkans and also in Macedonia, a balance that is in favor of the moderate forces.

The reality is the world has survived dramatic changes after the terrorist attack on America on 11 September 2001. In accordance with the changed reality, the super power has reformulated the priorities of its foreign policy. The “war against terror” reached the very top of the list of issues that have a direct reflection on the security and well being of Americans. Allies have become the most valuable thing for George Bush’s administration in the international sphere. A number of the EU member states, including Greece, were either against or were reserved about the war in Iraq. Macedonia, despite European objection, has become a US ally in an unpopular war. The primary national interest of America, success in the “fight against terror,” simply implied that their ally—Macedonia—is to be rewarded. Or, to be more precise – Republic of Macedonia!

On the other hand, what would the decision of the great power have been on the name of our country had Greek soldiers been in the front lines in the “war against terror” in Iraq? Or, what would Kerry’s Democrats have decided about Macedonia, with their position in favor of renewing of the destroyed bridges with leading EU states had they won the elections? Likely, very likely, we would not have had reason to cheer. Is it possible that such crucial decisions for the small states depend on such “chances?” The answer is – yes! Therefore, let us prepare for any future “chances,” which may not necessarily be favorable, as the last one has been. All right--but can we at least foresee those situations? “Whatever you foresee as taking place in ten years from today, unless it is something completely unrelated to human relations, such as the rising of the Sun, for example, you are almost certain to be wrong,” Bertrand Russel concludes. Bearing this in mind, the American professors of international politics, concerned about the security and well being of their country, warn their students: “The world is a dangerous place to live in!”

Ask us…

Translation:
Kalina Maleska-Gegaj

Proofreading:
Heather Booth, Clarity International

[1] Denko Maleski was minister of foreign affairs after the independence of Macedonia from 1991-1993 and after that an ambassador in the UN.