

The Usage of Proxy Militias in the Horn of Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo

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This study of insurgency groups and the counter insurgency measures used in the DRC, Ethiopia and the Sudan reveals the uniqueness of the relationships that exists between the marginalized groups and the governing powers of each nation state. The populations of the Sudan, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo will continue to be afflicted by war because of the usage of proxy militias that only serve to intensify pre-existing problems. In the marginalized regions of these countries there must be a serious effort to stop the usage of proxy militias to quell unrest in ungoverned regions and more emphasis should be placed on strengthening state and local institutions so that political legitimacy can be established.

Internal strife, oppression and human atrocities are a part of the political, social and economic fabric of many African states. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia and the Sudan are among the nation states of Africa that have historically and currently been affected by such issues. The on going crises in these three nation states have been exacerbated by the usage of proxies as counter insurgency measures. Government forces in the aforementioned case studies have fought along side proxy militias in an effort to stop various insurgency groups but it has only led to more death and destruction.

There are many reasons why African governments have continued to rely on such ineffective counter-insurgency measures. The first being corruption and lack of infrastructure. Most African governments are dysfunctional due to weak state institutions

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that are plagued by corruption and the lack of infrastructure which has resulted in the inability to provide basic services for the citizenry at large. In addition to corruption and lack of infrastructure, large African states such as the Sudan, the DRC, and Ethiopia are saddled with the responsibility of using feeble state institutions to govern a vast amount of territory which further challenges the political legitimacy of the central government. Thus, insurgency groups and counter insurgency measures are a response to the dysfunction of the state.

Oftentimes African armies are incapable of winning the war against insurgency groups because they lack the financial resources and the military equipment that is needed to “attack the guerrillas on the scale required to defeat them.”¹ Additionally, insurgency groups are usually heavily entrenched in the country side which is not widely controlled by the government. The task of defending a large land mass and a widely dispersed population is further complicated by an undisciplined military force that many times does not receive pay for services rendered. The inability to project power due to weakened military capabilities has caused beleaguered African governments to favor the usage of proxies as an inexpensive counter-insurgency measure. The co-option of irregular militias that live among groups that oppose the government in many cases has also proven to be very beneficial because such a tactic divides and distracts groups that could potentially unite. “Although militias provide immediate advantages for the government,”² in the long run it does not provide an environment for constructive engagement and peace. This study of insurgency groups and the counter insurgency measures used in the DRC, Ethiopia and the Sudan reveals the uniqueness of the

relationships that exists between the marginalized groups and the governing powers of each nation state.

The Democratic Republic of Congo

The DRC which is home to the world's largest peace keeping mission due to years of civil strife has been adversely affected by the Congolese army and its relationship with various insurgency groups. The insurgency groups that exist both inside and outside of the DRC have had a profound impact on the nation state's institutional capacity. The governing powers of the DRC have especially been plagued by the troubles in the eastern region of the country. The central, regional and local governance in the eastern region of the country has been challenged by armed factions and age- old ethnic and land disputes at the individual, family, clan and village level. This has played a major role in destabilizing the nation-state. Since the DRC is the second largest country on the continent and it is populated by roughly fifty-six million people "who belong to more than two hundred and fifty ethnic groups,"³ this paper will focus only on the government's relationship with militia groups in the eastern region of the country such as the Mayi Mayi and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).

The relationship between the Congolese government and proxy militias such as the FDLR and Mayi Mayi began during Laurent Kabila's reign as head of state. Laurent Kabila's rise to power was birthed out of civil unrest among ethnic groups in the Kivu region of eastern Congo regarding land disputes and the citizenship of displaced persons and refugees. Tensions also arose from President Mobutu Sese Seko's political, economical and social support of ethnic minorities particularly of Rwandan descent.

Because of this unrest, neighboring countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and Uganda helped to form a coalition which led to the eventual overthrow of the Mobutu regime. The Rwandan government provided military support for the overthrow of Mobutu because of its intense need to protect Rwandan Tutsis which populated the mineral rich regions of eastern Congo. The Rwandan government's desire to protect co-ethnics in eastern Congo led to the discovery of eastern Congo's greatest mineral resources such as cassiterite, coltan, gold, diamonds and palm nuts. Discovery of such minerals resulted in Uganda and Rwanda becoming major exporters of cassiterite, coltan, and gold which are very limited in quantity in both countries. Consequently, Laurent Kabila later used the Mayi Mayi and the FDLR as proxies to protect against several invasions that were made by Rwanda and former allies. The Rwandan government was especially offended when Kabila fired Congolese political officials of Rwandan descent, suspended Congolese/Rwandan military relations, "and began inciting the population to racial hatred toward Rwandans and Congolese of Rwandan ancestry."⁴

Throughout the years factionalism and shifting alliances have complicated the relationship between the government, the FDLR and the Mayi Mayi. Currently, there are some factions within the FDLR and the Mayi Mayi that continue to support the government and others that do not. The alliance between the FDLR and Mayi Mayi was established shortly after the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Following the cessation of the Rwandan genocide and Paul Kagame, Rwanda's current Tutsi President's rise to power, one million Rwandan Hutu refugees fled to the eastern Congo which caused the Congolese people in the eastern region to organize unstructured armed groups called the Mayi Mayi. Because of the failure to establish the rule of law in the eastern region the

Mayi Mayi was given the responsibility of protecting the local citizenry from unlawful acts committed by the incoming Rwandan population which was comprised of Hutu and Tutsi refugees, fleeing genocidaires, and troops from the Rwandan national army. Some factions within the Mayi Mayi rebel group soon joined forces with the defeated Hutu rebels that had just arrived. This was the beginning of the Mayi Mayi-FDLR alliance. The newly arrived Hutu rebels eventually became fortified in the eastern Congo because of their alliance with the Mayi Mayi rebel group which enabled them to gain access to certain mineral rich lands and mines.

Joseph Kabila, the current head of state and the son and successor of the former President Laurent Kabila, used the Mayi Mayi-FDLR alliance to fight against Tutsi dissidents that were supporting the Rwandan-backed Tutsi General Laurent Nkunda. Laurent Nkunda was the leader of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) which is a rebel movement that was established to protect the rights of the Tutsi people of eastern Congo. Continuous public outcry regarding human rights violations that were committed by General Nkunda and his followers resulted in his recent arrest that occurred on January 22, 2009. General Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda during joint military operations between Rwandan forces and the Congolese army. Military cooperation between the neighboring countries had not existed for many years because of previous invasions of the DRC by Rwandan forces and adverse relations between Tutsis and Hutus. General Laurent Nkunda was sympathetic to the Rwandan agenda which was to defeat all Hutu militia groups in the eastern Congo that posed a threat to Rwanda's national security and the Tutsi people both in the Congo and in Rwanda. Nkunda, a Rwandan Tutsi born in the DRC, was an advocate for the Rwandan agenda because his

parents fled their native country of Rwanda during the “first wave of ethnic killings in 1962.”⁵ Since the 2006 election of Joseph Kabila and the establishment of a new National Assembly that is radically bent on the ethnic cleansing of Congolese people of Rwandan descent there have been renewed fears of ethnic cleansing campaigns in the eastern region of the Congo. Consequently, low-level fighting between the Congolese government forces and General Nkunda’s troops became a major confrontation. The Congolese government routinely accused the Rwandan government of consistently supplying arms to General Nkunda’s rebel movement because of the great mineral wealth of the eastern Congo and the existence of Hutu militia groups in the region. Thus, the fight between the Congolese government, the FDLR-Mayi Mayi pro-government militia alliance and General Nkunda took on a regional as well as international character.

Before the recent arrest of General Nkunda the Congolese army increased its supply of weaponry to the FDLR –Mayi Mayi alliance so that they could continue the fight against a common enemy. According to the British Broadcasting Center (BBC) and other reliable media outlets the Congolese government supplied the FDLR and Mayi Mayi with uniforms, boxes of AK-47 ammunitions and boxes of 82mm bomb shells.⁶ Recent reports from lobbying groups such as Global Witness also confirmed such reporting. Additionally, Global witness asserted that the culture of impunity in the eastern Congo has permitted the FDLR-Mayi Mayi alliance to commit grave human rights violations against the civilian population. Global Witness and other lobby groups stated that the FDLR-Mayi Mayi alliance is responsible for maiming and abducting young children, raping women and killing both men and women. According to persons interviewed by Human Rights Watch, villages are also repeatedly raided for cattle, goats,

sheep and other goods. Some villagers asserted that all persons who are opposed to the FDLR-Mayi Mayi Alliance and its agenda are accused of collaborating with enemy militia groups and they are eventually killed or either tortured. Local residents have also accused the Congolese armed forces and the FDLR-Mayi Mayi alliance of taking control of various mines and forcing civilians to work for them or hand over their mineral production so that such minerals could be sold in exchange for arms.

Peace efforts will be strengthened in the DRC and throughout the region when the government rejects the culture of impunity by not only punishing General Laurent Nkunda for committing human rights violations but other rogue elements of society such as the Mayi Mayi and the FDLR that have committed similar crimes. The government of the DRC and other governments throughout the Great Lakes region must develop a strong commitment to peace and reconstruction by establishing and adhering to the rule of law so that the safety and security of all its citizens can be promoted.

Ethiopia

The government of Ethiopia, like the Democratic Republic of Congo has experienced both an internal struggle with various ethnic groups and an external struggle with neighboring countries. Due to ineffective governance, disputed borders and a tumultuous relationship with its neighbors, Ethiopia also has to utilize proxy militias to quell uprisings from various groups. Because Ethiopia is inhabited by a wide variety of cultures and ethnic groups and its relationship with each of its neighbors is quite different, the focus of this study will be on the Ogadeni people of the Ogaden region which has directly impacted Ethiopia's relationship with neighboring Somalia.

The Ogaden is a vast contested area that occupies the barren plain between the Somali-Ethiopia border and the eastern Ethiopian highlands.⁷ The Ogaden is sparsely populated by ethnic nomadic Somalis pastoralist whose land was partitioned by a series of treaties between colonial rivaling powers such as Britain, Italy, France and Ethiopia. After many power struggles between imperialist powers, control of the Ogaden region shifted from the Italians, to the British and then finally to the Ethiopians. Somali independence which was gained in 1960, proved to be quite challenging to Ethiopia because of the irredentist policy that was embraced by the political leaders of the newly established republic. “Somalia laid claim to the Somali-populated regions of French Somaliland (better known as present day Djibouti, the north eastern corner of Kenya, and the Ogaden.”⁸

Irredentism played a major role in the 1977 war between Ethiopia and Somalia. During this time period the Somali government began arming a guerrilla organization by the name of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). This organization was able to successfully capture large swaths of land in the Ogaden region because of the weak governing powers of the Dergue regime in Ethiopia. After major reorganizations within the Dergue regime, Tafari Banit Mengistu rose to power in Ethiopia. Major political, social and economical problems and the lack of support from the US due to the commission of human rights violations caused the newly established Mengistu leadership in Ethiopia to turn to the former Soviet Union for help. Because of its strategic location in the Horn of Africa and the desire to maintain interests in both Ethiopia and Somalia the former Soviet Union began supplying military weaponry to Ethiopia. However, the decision to supply weapons to a perceived enemy offended Somali officials and it

resulted in Soviet advisors being expelled from the country and the closing of various Soviet naval facilities in Berbera. Frosty diplomatic relations between Somalia and the former Soviet Union caused the Soviets to develop closer relations with Ethiopia. After receiving \$875 million worth of Soviet weaponry, Ethiopia was able to regain full control of the Ogaden region in March 1978.⁹

As previously stated, strained Ethiopian-Somali relations are central to the current crisis in the Ogaden region. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) is the major insurgency movement at the forefront of the current war in the contested area. The ONLF has been firmly established “as a movement for the independence of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia since August 15, 1984.”¹⁰ Seven years after becoming firmly established the ONLF became an official part of the Ethiopian Transitional Government which came to power after toppling the Mengistu regime because of its charter that supported self-determination for various nationalities. However, the ONLF’s relentless push for self determination caused tensions to rise among members of the ruling party. Consequently, Ethiopian security forces began to launch attacks against ONLF members in order to capture key members within the organization. Many civilians were killed during these attacks and many members of the ONLF fled to neighboring Somalia for safety. After fleeing to Somalia ONLF members joined forces with the al-Ittihad Islamist group which is alleged to have links to the Al-Qaida terrorist network. Failure to normalize relations with the Ethiopian government has resulted in an endless military campaign conducted by both sides in the Ogaden region.

Over the years the Ogadeni people have been subjected to rape, displacement, torture, and discrimination, restrictions on humanitarian aid and trade and killings.

Ethiopia's growing challenges concerning border tensions with neighboring Eritrea and Somalia and its lack of political currency among marginalized groups internally, has caused the Ethiopian government to rule by force and intimidation. Because Ethiopian armed forces are challenged on multiple fronts, the Addis Ababa regime has resorted to the usage of proxy militias in order to quell unrest in marginalized regions such as the Ogaden. Members of the Ogadeni community assert that the Ethiopian government is forcing civilians to fight in the war against the ONLF. Major townships in the Ogadeni region are heavily policed by Ethiopia's military but smaller villages and townships are relatively ungoverned by such forces. Therefore Ethiopia's army heavily "relies on locally recruited informers and militias for military intelligence, supplemental forces, and local knowledge."¹¹ According to Hassan Abdi Hees, a chief accountant in a government office in the Ogaden, "anybody who works for the government –teachers, doctors, clerks, administrators-has to join a [pro-government] militia."¹² Persons who are employed by programs that are funded by the UN and World Bank are also being conscripted to join pro-government militias. Civilians are oftentimes being forced to serve as "guides, porters, translators and foot soldiers."¹³ Most have not received the proper military training to fight the ONLF, thus, many needlessly die in combat. Western officials, refugees and other Ethiopian administrators who recently escaped the crisis in the region assert that the regime in Addis Ababa has "called on elders, traders, women, and civil servants to form local 'security committees' in order to mobilize their clans to destroy the [ONLF] rebels and their support bases."¹⁴ However, the Ethiopian government continues to maintain that joining these "security committees" are strictly voluntary but accounts corroborated by western officials, civilians and aid workers reveal otherwise. These

sources state that recruits are obtained by using several austere methods. The names of some persons are posted on public bulletin boards and if they refuse to report to duty such persons are jailed, fined, killed or they lose their jobs. Elders and fathers are sometimes given the option of either bringing their sons to join pro-government militias or they can supply weapons to the Ethiopian military.

In April 2007 the battle between the ONLF and the Ethiopian government became especially intense when the ONLF attacked a Chinese oil exploration site leaving seventy-four dead including nine Chinese workers.¹⁵ Since that incident occurred the government held several rallies in order to collect money and recruit militia forces. Young men who refused to attend such rallies were brutally beaten. In some cases the Ethiopian Army threatened to torch entire villages if villagers did not comply with their demands concerning militia recruitment and weapon supplies. The US based Human Rights Watch (HRW) has written an extensive report on the evidence that confirms these human rights violations that have been committed against the Ogadeni people by both the Ethiopian government and the ONLF. The HRW report asserts that the ONLF has been responsible for indiscriminate killings against anyone that is suspected of supporting the government's agenda. In many instances there have been beatings and executions of both civilians and government officials held in their custody. The international community has failed to take action against such violations in the way that it should, primarily due to ignorance which is the result of the Ethiopian government's efforts to prevent relief agencies and media outlets from gaining access to the region. Additionally, the sufferings of the Ogadeni people will continue to remain unnoticed as long as the US and other

major powers within the international community allow these sufferings to be overshadowed by Ethiopia's participation in the "War on Terror."

Sudan

The Sudan is another country in the Horn of Africa that is experiencing some of the same issues as its neighbor Ethiopia. Like the other aforementioned case studies, the Sudan is a very complex and diverse society in which the power center has a different way in which it relates to the various sub-groupings that are a part of the nation at large. Consequently, the main focus of this study will be on the on going crisis in the marginalized region of Darfur, which began with the Khartoum government's military and logistical support to Arab proxy militias in the region. To enhance its control and dominance over particular ethnic groups that threaten its political and economic agenda the Khartoum government has traditionally engaged in proxy wars by using Arab militia groups that work closely with the Sudanese Armed Forces to oppress Black African ethnic groups. These militia groups are commonly referenced by using different names. In various other marginalized regions such as the Nuba Mountains, during the years of the North-South conflict these Arab militia groups were commonly referred to as the "Murahaleen" which meant "Holy Warriors." In most recent years in the Darfur region such groups are referred to as the "Janjaweed" which means "Devil on a Horseback." The Khartoum government's support of these Arab militia groups in the Darfur and in other marginalized areas has promoted various social ills, such as rape, slavery, discrimination, confinement and displacement. Sudanese national identity has suffered because of the attacks that have been perpetrated on marginalized communities such as the Darfur.

Since independence the marginalization of regions such as the Darfur has intensified due to the government's unwillingness to develop such regions economically, politically and socially. The government's efforts to create a national identity that promotes the Islamic religion and Arab ethnicity also has complicated and exacerbated the matter. The politicization of Islam has not adversely impacted the Darfur community because most are Muslim. However, the issue of Arab ethnicity has been used by the government to relate more favorably towards Arab pastoralists in the region who are competing against African agriculturalists for various resources.

Like many Black African ethnic groups in the Sudan, the Black African Darfuri people have had an adversarial relationship with the central ruling powers of the Sudan for many years. The mistreatment of Black Africans within the Darfur community originated with the notion of Arab superiority which affected the region as early as the 14th century. During this period many Juhayana Bedowins from the Northwest as well as other Arab traders and scholars from both the east and west settled in the area. Over a period of time the Arabs and the indigenous ruling elite of the Kiera Dynasty developed close associations. Arab scholars that settled in the region became strong pillars in the established court system. Islam was eventually adopted and Arabic became the language of religious faith, scholarship and jurisprudence throughout the Darfur region which caused many to consider Arabs to be superior. This tumultuous relationship between Black Africans and Arabs was also profoundly affected during the colonial era when the British ruling powers decided to neglect outlying areas such as the Darfur in order to put all financial resources towards infrastructure development and agricultural expansion in the central region of Sudan nearest Khartoum.¹⁶ Governing a region such as Darfur was

considered to be both costly and inefficient by the British Colonial Administration. This permitted the Afro-Arab ethnic groups that inhabited the region nearest Khartoum to inherit all of the political and economical wealth during the decolonization period. This pattern of skewed development in Sudan has continued until to date.

Arab supremacy became even more pervasive in the Darfur community during the time period in which Libyan President Mummar al-Gaddafi attempted to establish a vast Islamic empire that stretched throughout the central African region. The founding of an Islamic empire involved the creation of an Islamic legion and the use of Darfur as a base for launching military strikes against Chadian territory. The Khartoum government received weapons from the Libyan government in exchange for their willingness to ignore these military campaigns. Additionally, thousands of people from Libya, Chad and Darfur joined the ranks of the Islamic legion because of Gaddafi's propaganda regarding Arab/Islamic identity. Gaddafi's promotion of Arab superiority and his strong support of Islam helped to foster tensions among Arabs and Black Africans living in Darfur. Gaddafi's actions not only inflamed tensions between Africans and Arabs in the Darfur region but such actions resulted in proxy wars between Chad, Libya and the Sudan. In the mid-1980s Darfur residents suffered from battles among forces of the Chadian government, Chadian rebels who were aligned with people from the Zaghawan ethnic group in both Chad and Darfur and the Libyan army.¹⁷

In 2003, the Khartoum government armed Arab militia groups in an effort to stop the armed resistance of the Fur, a Black African ethnic group in Darfur that demanded to be included in the peace deal that was later signed by the Khartoum government and the Southern Liberation Movement in 2005. However, the Khartoum government was

unwilling to make these concessions because they feared that this would encourage other ethnic groups living in marginalized regions to make demands for similar accommodations. For years Black African groups in the Darfur engaged in armed resistance against the Sudanese government because of economic and political oppression but at this point in time, unlike years before, the Black African rebel movements made significant headway in their efforts to oppose the national government. Significant headway was made because of the inner turmoil that the national government was experiencing due to international pressure to sign the North-South peace deal. Darfuri rebel movements also enjoyed an immense amount of support from the following sources: the local Darfuri populace, the rebel movements in the south, co-ethnics in Chad, Darfurians in the national army and wealthy Darfurian businessmen in the Persian Gulf. The local, national and international support received by the Darfuri rebels from the aforementioned sources resulted in them becoming a formidable force to be reckoned with.

Regional politics, as well as environmental factors such as drought and overpopulation have also exacerbated tensions in the Darfur region. Climate change and overpopulation have adversely affected life in the land of Darfur which covers an area of approximately 200,000 miles and is home to a population of 7 million.¹⁸ The population of Darfur is a complex and interwoven ensemble of African and Arab ethnic groups.¹⁹ Relations between these various ethnic groups were further strained when the government began depopulating Black African villages so that Arab camel herders who lost most of their traditional lands due to climate change, deforestation and desertification could populate such lands. Leaders within the Fur ethnic group in the Darfur region

continue to accuse the government of dealing unjustly among the Darfuri people. They insist that the depopulation of villages and consequent changes to land ownership are part of a “subversive government strategy to change the whole demography of the region.”²⁰ However, the Khartoum government maintains that conflicts within the Darfur region are primarily due to the scarcity of grazing and water resources.

The ongoing fight between Africans and Arabs in the Darfur region has continued to fuel the current conflict between the Darfuri rebel groups and the northern government despite the signing of a peace agreement in May 2006. The May 5, 2006 peace agreement that was signed by the northern government and Darfur’s largest rebel movement, the Sudan Liberation Army led by Minni Arkou Minawi was a step in the right direction according to some. This agreement stipulates that all proxies must be disarmed and successfully integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces, the police force or they must be reeducated and trained. This agreement also established the Transnational Darfur Regional Authority which is to be led by rebel signatories that are charged with the responsibility of implementing the peace agreement. This peace agreement requires a referendum to be held in 2010 to determine whether the Darfur should become a single region ruled by one government.²¹ Under this agreement rebel signatories are promised seats in both state and local ministries. Additionally, the northern government is mandated to contribute \$200-300 million a year for the rebuilding of infrastructure in the region and it must “provide \$30 million in compensation to victims of the conflict.”²²

Because this peace agreement has not been accepted by all Darfuri rebel groups and there have been no effective measures that have been taken by the Sudanese government to disarm proxy militias, violence persists in the region despite the

deployment of a peacekeeping force in 2007. Since the peacekeeping force remains handicapped due to lack of manpower and equipment, the crisis in the Darfur has become a major humanitarian disaster. An estimated 2.45 million persons have been displaced and an estimated 450,000 people have been killed.²³ Arab militia groups who are allied with government forces have especially committed acts of violence against the Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit peoples in the Darfur. The aforementioned ethnic groups have been especially targeted because of their adversarial relationship with the central government which has existed for many years. When attacking Fur, Zaghawan and Massaleit villages government forces and allied Arab militia use a tactic which is referred to as “combing.” The “combing process” encourages complete and total destruction of everything and everyone in the immediate area under attack. Since the central component of combing is the burning of villages, men, women, children and animals are burned alive. After their villages have been raided many villagers are tortured, their eyes are oftentimes plucked out and their ears are cut off. The government’s “combing operations” have a dual purpose: it creates destitution among the marginalized population and it allows government forces and Arab militia groups to receive furniture, food, clothing and other items by looting the village. Many villages are totally decimated by helicopter gun ships and high-level bombers as well as artillery and foot soldiers.²⁴

In the Darfur thousands are forced to relocate and live in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps because they have no shelter and food. In these IDP camps many are forced to live in horrible conditions and women folk are oftentimes raped by government forces and Arab militia men while gathering fuel resources in order to cook the rationed food that they have received. The African Rights Organization and other

human rights organizations have indicated that the government's policy of rape in these IDP camps is designed to destroy the very fabric of many Black African farming communities in the hopes of creating a new generation with "Arab paternity." In addition to being raped, there has been some Black African, Darfuri people who have been abducted and enslaved by Arab militia groups and government forces. The government routinely has used abduction and enslavement to advance its policy of Arabization and Islamization of non-Muslim groups, but, in a region such as Darfur where most are Muslim, abduction and enslavement occurs on a much smaller scale due to the fact that Sharia law forbids Muslims to enslave fellow Muslims.

The first hand accounts of Brian Stiedle, a former US Marine who served as a Patrol Leader in a ceasefire mission in Sudan clearly depicts the relationship that exists between the Janjaweed and the central government. In the book entitled "*The Devil Came on Horseback Bearing Witness to the Genocide in Darfur*," Steidle asserts that the Janjaweed attack Darfur villages using well coordinated military offensive techniques which indicate that the Arab militias are receiving training from government armed forces. The Janjaweed attack Darfur villages using a military offensive technique that is referred to as "'bounding over watch' which is a leapfrogging maneuver that involves one small unit firing while another moves forward under another unit's protection."²⁵ Steidle also asserted that the usage of such offensive techniques require knowledge of combat, command and control which further substantiates the fact that the Janjaweed receive intensive training from government armed forces. Many of Steidle's US and local contacts in Sudan reported that the Arab militias were being sent to special operation schools in northern Khartoum to be trained. Photographs taken by Brian

Steidle himself also revealed that militias were being given weapons and receiving training by government forces. These photographs showed that militias were being given “ammunition belts and paratrooper-version Kalashnikovs with retractable stocks and aiming sticks.”²⁶ Additionally, Steidle’s interviews with various members of the Janjaweed confirmed that they receive their weapons from government officials but they refused to provide further details regarding the weapons acquisition process. Steidle’s research regarding the Sudanese government’s relationship with Arab proxy militias revealed that the leaders of the Janjaweed militia units are paid a salary by the government while rank-and-file fighters are paid in loot.²⁷ Oftentimes the Janjaweed are given orders by the government to attack certain villages and on many occasions the Janjaweed stage attacks using their own discretion along with area police that are under the command of the Sudanese Armed Forces that are based in the Nyala region.

In the Darfur region attempts to bring peace to the area continue to be blocked by the following reasons: the government’s unwillingness to make a serious effort to adhere to the previously signed peace agreement, the oil proceeds that are received by the Sudanese government from other countries that are used to supply arms to the Janjaweed and the northern government’s cooptation of Darfuri rebel group leaders that seek to gain more power and access to state resources. Unfortunately, the plight of the Darfuri people will only worsen because of the Northern Sudanese government’s decision to expel thirteen non-governmental organizations that provide aid for approximately 4.7 million persons. Such organizations were expelled due to suspicions of collaboration with the International Criminal Courts (ICC) and their efforts to arrest Northern Sudanese President Omar Bashir for war crimes. The national and international support Bashir has

received for his decision to reject the ICC's arrest warrant and his recent decision not to rescind the expulsion of various aid agencies will only serve to exacerbate the suffering of the Darfuri people and other marginalized communities in the Sudan.

The populations of the Sudan, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo will continue to be afflicted by war because of the usage of proxy militias that only serve to intensify pre-existing problems. In the marginalized regions of these countries there must be a serious effort to stop the usage of proxy militias to quell unrest in ungoverned regions and more emphasis should be placed on strengthening state and local institutions so that political legitimacy can be established. In the marginalized regions of these countries there must also be immense investments socially and economically so that the war economy in these regions could cease to exist and the quality of life could be enhanced.

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² Oystein H. Rolandsen, "Sudan: The Janjawid and Government Militias," in *African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine* eds. Morten Boas and Kevin C. Dunn (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. 2007) 165.

³ Claude Kabemba, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," in *Big African States* eds. Christopher Chapman, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills (South Africa: Wits University Press 2006), 99.

⁴ Severine Autesserre, “The Trouble With Congo; How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict,” *Foreign Affairs* 94 Vol. 87 (May / June 2008) under “Settings,” <https://www.intelink.gov/proquest/pdqweb?index=1&did=14834999531&SrchMode=2&si..html> (accessed December 6, 2008).

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¹⁰ Adam Ulan, “Ogaden National Liberation Front. Research Library,” *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 9 (July/Aug 2004) under “Settings,” <https://www.intelink.gov/proquest/pdqweb> (accessed December 29, 2008).

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¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Terrance Lyons, “Ethiopia’s Convergence of Crises,” *Current History A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs* 8 Vol. 107 .(Apr 2008) under “Settings,” <https://www.intelink.gov/proquest/pdqweb?index=0&did=1465589311&SrchMode=2&si...> (accessed December 21, 2008).

¹⁶ Tony Lindsay, *Darfur-Cultural Handbook*, April 2007, Defence Academy, United Kingdom, 8.

¹⁷ Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan-Contested National Identities*, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1998), 162.

¹⁸ Gerard Prunier, *Darfur: Ambiguous Genocide*, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY),4.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Tony Lindsay, *Darfur-Cultural Handbook*, April 2007. Defence Academy, 34.

²¹ U.S. Department of State Website. <http://www.state.gov>

²² Ibid.

²³ African Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Sudan : The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North South Peace Agreement updated July 23, 2008. Congressional Research Report. Summary page.

²⁴ Brian Steidle and Gretchen Steidle Wallace, *The Devil Came on Horseback Bearing Witness to the Genocide in Darfur*, (Public Affairs, New York, NY 2007) 63.

²⁵ Steidle, 79.

²⁶ Steidle, 164.

²⁷ Ibid.