Vrban Todoro
The Conflict in Macedonia – Hypotheses for Development
part II

<< part I

The fate of Macedonia should be considered in close relation with the future status of Kosovo. Here as well, there are the two main participants in the conflict situation: the still dominant Macedonian community and the Albanian community that lives in the Republic. For now, it is difficult to say what the real ratio between them is because of the firm refusal of part of the Albanians to be counted. The “fictive” state border between Macedonia and Kosovo, and the constant flow of people between them, additionally complicate the census. During the NATO war against Serbia a great number of refugees started populating Macedonia, and it is not known for certain how many of them have returned to Kosovo since the end of the war.

It was easy to foresee, even before the Kosovo crisis, that the legal and illegal Albanian organizations for liberating Kosovo would continue to act on the territory of Serbia and Macedonia, regardless of what form and name they had in front of the international community. During the last decade (after the disintegration of SFRY), the Albanians showed that “they can wait patiently for their moment to come”. Thus, they did not rush to present their requests during the war between the Serbs and the Croats, or during the war in Bosnia, knowing full well that the attention of the world was directed somewhere else, and that the world would not look favourably on another hotspot in the Balkans. Therefore, as soon as the crisis in Bosnia finished, and as soon as they were certain that they had secured the attention of the “international community”, the Albanians openly posed the question for their rights. It became clear from the very beginning that this was not a case of disagreements based on religion, language or anything else, but it was a request purely on a national basis for the appearance of the so-called Albanian nationalism. The success of the Albanian cause in Kosovo, not without the help of NATO, the US and the EU, inevitably led to the “export” of extremism to the Republic of Macedonia, inflamed by ideas and people, with weapons and paramilitary organizations.

In practice, the Kosovo variant from the beginning of the 80s is starting to repeat itself – first was the request for the opening of an Albanian university in Tetovo, and then the requests have multiplied to include more cultural, citizen and minority rights, recognition of the Albanian language as an official language; the issue for changing the Constitution is also raised, even the transformation of Macedonia into a federative (confederative) state composed of Albanians and Macedonians. It is only a matter of time when there will be an official request for the separation of western Macedonia, populated mainly by Albanians, and its annexation to Kosovo.

We can demonstrate clearly both internal and external reasons for the escalation of the conflict between the Albanians and the Macedonians.

External factor: geo-political, geo-strategic and geo-economical interests of the so-called great forces interested in this region, which not only failed to undertake preventive measures to subdue the already appearing disagreements between the two communities, but, on the contrary, they are directly or indirectly responsible because they closed their eyes before the appearance of Albanian extremism, and pressured directly the Macedonian leaders into making concessions to the Albanian requests. For a long time, the “international community” hesitated as to how to call the military attacks by the Albanians in Macedonia – whether as instances involving “Albanian terrorists” or “Albanian rebels”. It was not just after the terrorist attacks on the USA (11 September, 2001), that the “international community” and the world media started accepting the term “terrorists”, but even then some western experts and official mediators made a difference between “good” and “bad”, bearing in mind that the former refers to the Albanians.

Internal factor: it is not always directly connected with the external; nevertheless, the latter plays a direct stimulating role in this case. The Albanian requests gradually start to cross the line of a normal striving for cultural and language rights of a minority, matters that can be reached on the basis of dialogue and mutually acceptable compromise between the two communities. For almost a year, the Macedonian state was fighting a war with Albanian paramilitary groups, who are protected directly by the US, NATO and the EU, and are presented by them as “fighters for justice and human rights”. As a state, Macedonia has sufficient strength to deal alone with the internal problems, but it is not allowed to. It loses the war on the diplomatic front, and, under strong external pressure, it is forced to refrain from military actions against the Albanian terrorists, and to start changing its Constitution.

Thus, we arrive at the Ohrid Agreement of 13 August, 2001, for political reforms for the stabilization of the country, an agreement in which 15 constitutional amendments are formulated – for the official use of the Albanian language, for giving more rights to the Albanian minority, for nominating Albanians in the state and the municipality services, in the juridical system and in the police. Of course, the Albanian paramilitary organization for liberation (ANA) appears, stating that it does not recognize the Ohrid Agreement and would fight till the end for separating the western part of Macedonia.

On the one hand, ANA may serve to simply justify the significant quantity of weapons left in the hands of the Albanian population, despite NATO’s operation “Essential Harvest”. On the other, such an organization is a logical necessity so that there can be constant provocations to the fragile agreement between the two communities, and that there can be a basis for constant pressure on the internal and international plan for bigger concessions. The final aim is hardly a secret to anyone – “national unification with the other parts of the fatherland, divided 100 years ago by the predecessors of the European politicians”.

On 16 October, 2001, the Macedonian Parliament accepts the new Constitution of the country which envisages greater rights for the Albanian minority. According to the amended Preamble and the 15 constitutional amendments, the Macedonian language remains official in the Republic, whereas in the regions where over 20% of the population is Albanian the Albanian language also becomes official – parallel with the Macedonian. Guarantees are given for greater participation of Albanians in the state administration and the police, and mechanisms are created for blocking decisions in the Parliament and in the municipal organs concerning legal projects in the area of culture. Finally, the changed text of the Preamble of the Constitution is: “the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian nation, as well as the citizens who live within the borders of the state, and who are part of the Albanian nation, Turkish nation, Vlach nation, Serbian nation, Roma nation and others, have equal rights”.

We are witnesses of a great, conscious or unconscious mixing up of the notions, partly as a result of the pressure of western “experts”, and of the compromises in the discussions and disputes among different conceptions of Albanians and Macedonians regarding the issue of what kind of group nations are included in the Macedonian state, and in what way they represent it. To the Macedonians, it is essential that the term “Macedonian nation” is retained, but this term is previously territorially delineated, and refers to the citizens that live in the Republic. In such a way, all the fears of Macedonia’s neighbours (Greece and Bulgaria) of possible pretensions on the Macedonian side over its population in the border regions are abolished.

This is not the case in terms of the representatives of the minority (apart from the Albanian) groups in Macedonia. They are determined as parts of their corresponding nations that live in the Republic of Macedonia, and who obviously do not live only on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. I will only briefly mention here that it is uncertain what kind of criteria has been used to include representatives of some ethnic minorities, and leave out others. When we leave aside the fact that it is very strange to talk about a “Vlach nation”, which it is, and who else it includes apart from the Vlachs (Aromani, Cincars) in Macedonia, the term “part of the Roma nation” is also doubtful, because it is questionable whether we can talk at all about one Roma nation in the world, Europe or the Balkans, so that the Roma from Macedonia can be part of it.

If these two examples beg questions from a theoretical-scientific aspect, and which do not have practical consequences, the part of the formulation in the Preamble, which refers to the other minority groups in Macedonia, can be interpreted in a different way. If today we accept it is justifiable to say that those minority groups are part of the corresponding nations (Albania, Serbia, Turkey), tomorrow we may also find justifiable the desire of those parts to unite fully with their mother-nations. The text in the Preamble of the Macedonian Constitution will be a pretext to the advantage of such a development.

Although the new Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia can be accepted as a significant concession or a significant success (depending on one’s viewpoint) to the advantage of the ethnic minorities, it can hardly be accepted as something that will help overcome the ethnic conflicts and return the country to a period of peaceful coexistence among different citizens, regardless of their language, religion or ethnic background.

The development of the present conflict situation in Macedonia can be followed depending on what a direction the relations between the two most numerous groups in the Republic – those of the Macedonians and of the Albanians – are going to take.

In a peaceful development of that state (regardless of the form) and with a marked demographic increase in the Albanian population in it, the tendency is to have the Albanian ethnic and religious minority turn into a majority in Macedonia. That means that sooner or later the Albanians – Muslims, in a peaceful and democratic way, through elections, and independently, would take over the rule of the Republic. If there is a development and other favourable circumstances, such a course of events is just a matter of time – when the Albanian population in Macedonia reaches the number 50+1%. It is not by accident that since 1991, the Albanians have refused to be counted in a census – the lack of clarity of this issue gives constant food for different political speculations. Thus, in the 1994 census, it was officially announced that 443,000 Albanians were then living in Macedonia, while according to unofficial Albanian data, their number was 800,000. Regardless of the time, there is one perspective – the practical appearance of another (third) Albanian and Muslim state on the Balkans, and it is not beyond the imagination that in favourable circumstances it may request to be separated from Albania, or more surely from Kosovo, to represent an independent Albanian area or state.

Will the Christians in Macedonia (regardless of who recognises them and how), who until recently ruled the country, and who in such a situation would turn into a minority, come to terms with this perspective, and how will they react?

Will we again be witnesses of what is happening in Kosovo and in Macedonia today, only with the opposite sign – a new wave of ethnic and religious conflicts, bloodshed, ethnic cleansing and expulsions?

Another perspective is if the non-Albanian political forces that rule the Republic today don’t in some way allow for the above-mentioned developments. The least they can do is to try and use all methods and means (not necessarily only democratic) to prevent this. In this direction, they will, of course, have Serbia as an ally. It would be little wonder if the Republic of Macedonia is oriented in the future towards a closer economic and political connection with new Yugoslavia, which can some day lead to their unification under some form of an alliance or confederation on an equal basis. In such a situation, it would be more difficult for the Albanian population in Macedonia to present claims for greater and greater rights. In such way, the situation that existed 50 years previously would be renewed, one which was accepted as such by the neighbouring Balkan states and by the world. For such a variant, there is, of course, need for consent by the “international community”, which would hardly tolerate it at this stage because of the strengthening of Serbia. Although today it seems incredible, the perspective for unifying Macedonia (or a part of it) with the new Yugoslavia could, in certain circumstances, prove the most realistic variant for the future.

The third variant for the development of Macedonia is seen in the situation where the still ruling Slave majority in Macedonia is directed towards some closer relation with a certain Balkan state, at the same time displaying a determined attitude towards “more and greater” rights for the Albanian population. After the change of the Constitution of the state, the Albanian extremists will not get so much support from the international community. And if they continue with their terrorist acts, it is possible that they will encounter resolute resistance by the Macedonian authorities. The problem is that these sorts of developments can lead to deepening the interethnic conflict.

The exhaustion of political dialogue, of political means and of mutual concessions will lead to the radicalisation of the Albanian requests – to presenting officially the issue of the territorial separation of Macedonia into two parts – western (Albanian and Muslim) and eastern (Macedonian, Slave and Christian).

Even if the fate of the Albanian part is more than clear – unification with the Albanians from Kosovo in one state (and some day there could happen the unification of Albanians in one country), the question is whether the eastern part of the present Macedonia has the chance of being retained and remaining as an independent state – a buffer zone between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria?

It remains uncertain how the three Balkan states will react in such a situation, and whether the old contradictions between them will or will not again become current? (The old, proven and more certain variant may be preferable: unification, even of a part of Vardar Macedonia with New Yugoslavia, certainly as a fully equal federative unit.)

The fourth perspective for the development of Macedonia is for the present leadership of the Republic to continue to look for a way toward reasonable compromise with the requests of the Albanians, trying in such a way to prolong or postpone the disagreements, and counting on the time factor.

The acceptance of greater cultural and political rights for the Albanian minority in Macedonia, which became fact with the change of the Constitution, should lead to limiting Albanian strife and to a temporary solution to the conflict situation that appeared between the two main groups of the Republic’s population. If the requests of the Albanians continue according to the principle “you give them an inch, they swim all over”, then the variants of development are twofold: either the position of the Macedonian leadership towards the Albanians should become stronger and, as a final option, result in a complete separation between the two communities, and the dissolution of the country (that mostly depends on international conjuncture) or the path of compromise should continue, and it would not be surprising if it led, at a certain moment, to the forming of a confederation between the two communities – the Albanian and the Macedonian – within the present Republic.

Whether such a type of federative system has any chance of survival will depend on both the internal development of the Republic, and on the intentions of the international community for the development of that part of the Balkans. In the present situation, we can notice the prominent tendency of the “international community” to try and turn Macedonia into an “international protectorate”, and even link it to Kosovo. The politicians in Macedonia reacted fiercely to such a development of the situation, which puts them in the role of simple monitors of their own fate, while it puts the state in the role of a hostage of someone else’s geo-political interests.

It is interesting to follow the position of Macedonia in the process of Euro-integration. Can we talk about Macedonia entering the European Union in a situation where the country is torn apart by internal disagreements, which won’t stop at any time in the foreseeable future? Seen from a European perspective, there is no doubt that, one day, all Balkan states will become EU members. There is one road to the European Union and all countries in the region have directed themselves towards it. The criteria that the EU poses are political and economical. If we judge according to economical signals, Macedonia could hardly fulfil them even after 15 years. The same could be said for Bulgaria as well, although it is not burdened by ethnic-minority conflict. If, because of some situation, the political criterion is preferred (or regional, for example), then both have chances to enter the EU earlier as equal members.

In the case of Macedonia, the main supposition for its future Euro-integration is establishing peace and reaching political stability in the country. Regardless of who is going to be dominant in the short term or long term – the Albanian or the Macedonian community – and regardless of whether Macedonia will become a federation or will remain a unitary state, the extension of the Euro-integration process will be possible only after peaceful developments are established. If different circumstances lead to the disintegration of Macedonia as a state, or if it turns into an official “international protectorate”, that would mean that the process of Euro-integration would be stopped for a certain period of time, which would have negative effects on the whole Balkan region and its path towards a unified Europe.

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