Editorial
Mirjana Maleska
Editor-in-chief
WITH THE EYES OF THE “OTHERS”
(about Macedonian-Bulgarian relations
and the Macedonian national identity) 1
I believe that many people in Macedonia may experience this selection
in “New Balkan Politics” as a provocation or, even worse, an insult.
Yet, possibly in that way, by facing unpleasant, even very painful
things, we can begin thinking more soberly about us and our future,
especially from the aspect of the stability and security in the
Balkans.
Why have articles by Bulgarian authors been selected when it is
well known that for a long time, and even today, some circles in
Bulgaria dispute our language and identity, and that here, in Macedonia,
we are very sensitive about this issue and have a tendency to argue
if the “other” does not think like us?
Times have changed. Since 1989 there is no more official ideology,
there are no longer external prohibitions, there is no censorship;
yet, we did not find in ourselves the strength to discuss with understanding
and tolerance some “taboo” issues, such as the more just “power-sharing”
between the majority and the minorities in Macedonia, or Macedonian-Bulgarian
relations, which is undoubtedly one such topic. This inherited habit
to wait for someone else “from above” to start the debate, usually
from some political power centre, that weakness to be dependent
marginalizes the intellectual elite and social thought. To take
as an example the crisis from 2001, for about ten years prior to
it, clear overconfidence had dominated in debates about the internal
stability of the country, so that the society was unprepared for
the dramatic changes that followed. When the crisis started, it
was already too late. Expelled on the periphery of events that were
taking place with enormous speed, members of the domestic academic
community experienced the Ohrid Peace Agreement no only as one imposed
by a greater force, but also as an offence to their own intellectual
dignity.
In Macedonia, post-war generations grew up “overdosed” with strong
anti-Bulgarian sentiment, leading to the creation of mainly negative
stereotypes for Bulgaria and its nation. The anti-bulgariansim (or
bulgarophobia) increased almost to the level of state ideology during
the ideological monopoly of the Communist Alliance (SKM), and still
continues to do so today, although with less ferocity. Part of that
anti-bulgarianism is due to the dark and tragic moments that Macedonians
have experienced in the past, and which have been caused by some
nationalistic and chauvinistic circles within Bulgaria, although
it should be stressed that in the history of the Balkans national-chauvinism
in some circles in Sofia was incited and encouraged by similar circles
in Belgrade and Athens, and vice versa.
However, it is more important to say openly that a great deal
of these anti-Bulgarian sentiments result from the need to distinguish
between the Bulgarian and the Macedonian nations. Macedonia could
confirm itself as a state with its own past, present and future
only through differentiating itself from Bulgaria.
In the enthusiasm with which the new state was built after 1945,
things were often exaggerated. This is especially true for the part
that S. Troebst calls nation-building “from above”, through the
“belts”, such as the party, ideology, schools, historical books,
etc., although it is indisputable that there were strong autochthonous
aspirations for integration [of the nation] “from below”(fierce
industrialisation, etc.) some time ago. Macedonians paid a high
price in that process of nation-building and are very proud their
achievement.
“Throughout Eastern Europe, historical science was politicised
in order to produce loyalty of both an ideological and national
kind, but in Macedonia there happened a specific phenomenon of an
interdependence of history and politics. The role of the historians
was not just to follow orders that came from politics”, Gunter Schtakel
emphasized in his research project 2.
Certainly not! The greatest part of the left-oriented members
of the intellectual and political elite participated in the building
of the young nation-state because it was in accordance with their
beliefs. If historians didn’t tell the whole truth, it was mostly
due to the honest conviction that it had to be that way, that it
could not be otherwise, and that that way it was the best for everyone.
Nevertheless, that does not mean that there was no political repression,
or that some people who expressed themselves differently were not
isolated in a corresponding manner. Here, we don’t touch upon the
issue of those who were killed, tried or imprisoned after the Second
World War for their separatist ideas for the secession of Macedonia
from the Yugoslav Federation, and for creating a united or greater
Macedonia (Aegean, Pirin and Vardar).
“Identities are not inherited like skin colour…, but constructed
as an art object”, David D. Laitin writes (“Identities in Formation”).
There is truth in the claim that contemporary Macedonianism is “constructed”;
however, it is too coarse and does not correspond to the truth to
say that it is a “Serbian ideological term” or “a creation of the
Comintern”. That was a complex process of the building and consolidation
of a new nation, a nation which had to survive and to withstand,
not only economically but culturally and politically, especially
opposing the constant attempts at the ethnic assimilation of the
Slave language population in Vardar Macedonia by the national (even
chauvinist) circles of neighbouring countries. “The Macedonians
know what they do not want to be”, S. Troebst writes in his article.
Why do we avoid facing some dark holes in our historical remembrance?
Memories of the political violence with
which the process of forming the Macedonian nation-state was accompanied
are still fresh. Tame and hospitable on the outside, Macedonia hides
many incredible, complex and fiercely tragic stories, which make
the Balkan “Balkan” in the eyes of curious foreigners. In just a
few years between the World Wars, in Takovska Street and in other
streets in Sofia, hundreds of Macedonians died in fratricidal assassinations
amongst opposing political fractions. It was the interests of others
that stood behind this fierce political violence, violence that
sent many Macedonian families into mourning, and that knowledge
became a significant part of our collective memory. National reconciliation
is impossible without understanding and forgiveness through sincere
and tolerant dialogue. But we haven’t opened it yet. The victims
of repression are still the victims, although the world meanwhile
has turned upside-down.
The liberating war of 1941-1945 in some dimension had the tragedy
of civil war because members of the same family joined one or the
other warring side. The separatism of the Macedonians in Tito’s
Yugoslavia, directly after the war, was also strongly enunciated,
creating deep divisions, fear and mistrust among the people. At
a “round table” held a few years ago on the subject of post-war
dissidence, several former political prisoners for the cause of
an independent (united) Macedonia came in uninvited. The frustration
some of them expressed in their speeches was heart-rending. They
disclosed that they could not get either recognition or public rehabilitation
even today.
Yet, the fear of history repeating itself, when the territory
and the population of Macedonia were divided among the neighbouring
countries, is not totally founded.
The situation in the Balkans today, in comparison to the situation
in the first half of the 20th century, has changed greatly.
Greece is interested in Macedonia remaining independent, a buffer
state between itself and Serbia and Bulgaria. Serbia also has an
interest in a status quo with reference to the existing border with
Macedonia. Albania is pressed by its underdevelopment, the overcoming
of which depends on Western support, while the pragmatic political
elites in the region are expending great effort towards becoming
members of the EU and NATO and to follow their “rules of the game”,
in which there is no place for violent change of the borders. Following
this trend, there have been significant changes in Bulgarian politics
towards recognition not only of the state, but also of the Macedonian
nation and language. The turning point came during the crisis of
2001. While in Macedonia some political personalities suggested
Bulgaria take sides in the conflict or at least flirt with pro-Macedonian
sentiments, Bulgarian officials gave clear statements that the citizens
in Macedonian had to solve their problems by themselves!
Since 1913 the Bulgarian Government has been
displaying, as Myron Weiner writes in “Macedonian Syndrome”, “an
uncanny instinct for engaging in losing wars and allying with the
losing side. In the First World War, Bulgaria sided with the Central
Powers against Russia, with the expectation that a German-Austrian
victory would lead to its acquisition of Macedonia. The persistence
of the claim to Macedonia was a decisive factor in Bulgaria’s decision
to join with Austria, Hungary and Germany in the Second World War
against Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia and the Allies. To the
very end, Bulgaria’s revisionist goals dominated its foreign policy,
even when it meant becoming a supporter of Germany’s efforts to
occupy all of the Balkans militarily. Bulgaria had literally cut
off its own nose to spite its face. Moreover, Bulgaria’s alliances
with Germany ran counter to deeply felt historical, religious and
cultural associations with Russia, thus demonstrating the overwhelming
role that irredentist sentiments have played in the choice of allies”.3
If we go back further in history, it should
be realised that Bulgaria experienced the placing of Macedonia within
the borders of the Ottoman Empire previously, with the Berlin Agreement
from 1878, as a great injustice inflicted on it by the Great Forces.
If we knew the poems of the great Bulgarian poet Pejo Javorov, we
might understand how painful the loss of something you love is.
But we do not know him, we don’t know his poetry, we don’t know
that he left comfortable Sofia to join the Ilinden Uprising and
we can therefore be arrogant and sneer at those sentiments.
The articles in this issue of the magazine analyse
the changes in Bulgarian society and politics during the last decade
concerning the “Macedonian issue”.
Marija Balalova calls this change ‘a turn from
a passionate or “romantic” current of Bulgarian society (and politics)
towards a“strong pragmatic current”’. Vrban Todorov is much more
direct. Talking about Bulgarian politics towards Macedonia during
the last decade, he says: “The permitted mistake, which was on the
highest level of mixing modern policy with historical, ideological
and emotional arguments, was paid for by Bulgaria with substantial
political and economic losses. It was amended, although silently,
not before 1999”. Mihail Todorov raises the issue of the rights
of those citizens in Bulgaria who declared themselves as Macedonians
and speak Macedonian.
Such turning points in a society do not happen
accidentally. They are a result of individual research efforts,
autonomy and, above all, courage of the people in the scientific
circles in Bulgaria. That is not so simple, and they pay a price
for it because in their own environment those people are often accused
of making a compromise with the state interests and betraying their
national ideals. It is very similar with the situation here in Macedonia,
having also in mind the fact that we are much more strict when we
condemn!
The Ohrid Peace Agreement (from August 2001)
has for now closed the military aspect of the conflict between
the central authority in Skopje and the Albanian guerrilla (ONA),
and made official ethnic and confessional pluralism. The strengthening
of the national identity, equality of the religions, languages and
cultures of the ethnic communities in Macedonia has been raised
on a level of state consensus, reinforced with guarantees from the
international community. One consequence of the conflict was a general
agreement that a more just society should be built. On
a general declarative level that may not be so difficult, but in
conditions of general poverty, a very high level of unemployment,
a reduction in state revenues and the redistribution of the public
resources, the Macedonian community can experience it as a threat
to its social security. On the other hand, if the political leaders
do not fulfil what they had promised in the Ohrid Agreement, a new
wave of discontent can be expected by the other ethnic communities
and, above all, the Albanian one. The problems are before us, and
if they come down to someone losing and another one winning (zero-sum-game),
then old hostilities may be revived.
Still, some optimism may be traced in the fact
that on the Macedonian political scene there are pragmatic politicians
among the Macedonians and the Albanians, as well as among the others,
who this time are more prepared to work in the interests of the
European future of Macedonia.
The opening of the issue of the Macedonian identity
and the painful historical memories of Macedonians and Bulgarians
can undoubtedly “add fuel to the fire”. It could encourage those
political currents that are against the unity and independence of
Macedonia, and introduce additional suspicions in the fragile interethnic
confidence.
However, that does not mean that this sensitive
issue cannot be viewed differently; that if all of us in Macedonia
– Macedonians, Albanians and others – want a better future for ourselves,
we not only have to count mainly on each other but also to lean
mainly on each other.
1 The articles by Kiril Kertikov, Mihail
Ivanov, Vrban Todorov and Marija Balkova are part of the scientific
project “Bulgaria-Macedonia: Problems of the Euro Integration”.
The results of this project, published in
a publication with the same name from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences,
2002, would not have been possible without the enthusiasm of PhD
Kiril Kerikov, director of the project.
Kiril Kerikov is one of those people, who,
after they get attached to some idea, work persistently and with
self-sacrifice in order to realize it. With little money and much
effort, he organized round tables on this topic and published two
scientific treatises.
In the publication: “Bulgaria-Macedonia: Problems of the Euro Integration”,
apart from the texts published in this issue of the magazine, are
also published the articles of Nikolaj Genov: “Conceptualising Social Transformation:
Lessons from Eastern Europe”; Dolores Asenova and Kiril Kertikov: “Bulgarian
Ethnic Model and the Constitutional Crisis in Macedonia”; Mirjana Maleska: Painful Facing: The Reasons
for and the Consequences of the Security Crisis in Macedonia; Zivko Nedev: “Bulgaria and Macedonia in the
Context of Euro Integration and Globalisation”; Petko Gancev: “Integration of the Balkans in
the Epoch of Globalisation – Suppositions for Integration in the
European Union”; Tanja Nedelceva: “Transformations in the
Bulgarian Identity and the Appearance of Macedonia”; Marina Zaharieva:
“The Social Situation in Bulgaria and Macedonia: Comparative Analysis”;
Ana Mantarova: “Ethnic Aspects of Criminality in Bulgaria
and Macedonia”; Anton Prvanov: “The Conflict Situation in
Macedonia during 2001”; Elisaveta Ignatova: “Bulgaria and Macedonia in
the Beginning of the 21st Century”; Vera Ganceva: “Macedonia: Media and Myths”;
Petko Petkov: “The Army and the Crisis in Macedonia”.
2 quoted according to Stefan Troebst’s text.
3 Myron Weiner:“The Macedonian Syndrome“, New Balkan
Politics, 2-3/2002
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